Trump’s Trade Chief Pushes G20 Toward U.S. Tariff Playbook as Canada Touts $33B Rise in Non-U.S. Trade

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Milwaukee has become a meeting point for two very different responses to a more fragmented trading system. U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer is using the G20 trade ministerial to press partners on forced labour, industrial overcapacity, food-trade restrictions and the World Trade Organization’s Most-Favoured-Nation rules, while defending the Trump administration’s broader use of tariffs and bilateral deals. Canada is arriving with a different message: International Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu says non-U.S. exports have risen by 17 per cent, or C$33 billion, as Ottawa pushes new commercial ties beyond its largest market. The contrast matters because Canada’s diversification drive is accelerating just as bilateral tensions with Washington remain elevated. As of October 1, ministers were still in their second day of meetings, so the gathering had not yet produced a final G20-wide outcome.

Greer Brings a Tariff-Centered Agenda Into the G20

Greer’s opening pitch in Milwaukee was broader than a defence of individual tariffs. The U.S. trade representative organized the ministerial around four workstreams: the “weaponization” of food trade, structural excess capacity, the Most-Favoured-Nation principle and forced labour in global supply chains. USTR has framed those issues as parts of the same problem — a trading system Washington believes has not responded forcefully enough to non-market practices and supply-chain risks.

That approach puts tariffs alongside bilateral deals and industrial policy as tools of economic security rather than temporary responses to disputes. Greer urged G20 economies to address overcapacity and reconsider parts of the post-war tariff framework, while USTR said the administration wants greater urgency and consensus. The discussion therefore reaches beyond U.S.-China trade. It asks whether other economies are prepared to use tougher trade barriers more routinely when they conclude that subsidies, forced-labour concerns or other policies are distorting market conditions.

The MFN Debate Goes to the Heart of the WTO System

The institutional debate in Milwaukee concerns the WTO’s Most-Favoured-Nation principle. In simple terms, MFN requires a WTO member that gives one trading partner a tariff advantage to extend comparable treatment to other members, subject to exceptions such as free-trade agreements and permitted trade-remedy actions. The principle sits near the centre of the multilateral system because it limits discrimination among trading partners and makes market access more predictable.

Greer argues that unconditional MFN treatment can make it harder for governments to respond to countries using subsidies or policies that distort markets. That challenges traditional WTO logic, where predictability and non-discrimination are goals. The WTO notes that exceptions already exist for free-trade agreements, developing-country preferences and measures responding to unfair trade under specified conditions. The Milwaukee debate is therefore not about whether differential tariffs can ever exist, but about how broad those exceptions should become in a more confrontational trading environment today.

Steel Becomes the Test Case for Coordinated Trade Barriers

Steel is an example of Washington trying to turn its trade approach into coordinated action. At the OECD-led Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity, 28 economies adopted the “Milwaukee Framework,” encouraging anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard investigations, tougher measures against steel linked to excess capacity, and tracing of where steel is melted and poured. The forum urged governments to avoid subsidies that keep uncompetitive mills operating.

The forum projects global steel excess capacity will rise from 601 million tonnes in 2024 to 745 million tonnes by 2028, explaining why the issue has become a priority for industrial economies. China and India, the world’s two largest steel producers, are not members. Beijing disputes the Western framing of Chinese “excess capacity,” arguing that the concept is used to justify protectionism and that production capacity should be assessed in a market context. That disagreement may shape whether the Milwaukee approach spreads beyond participating economies.

Forced Labour Adds a Human-Rights Case to Tariff Policy

Forced labour gives the U.S. tariff argument an important human-rights dimension. In July, USTR said it imposed Section 301 tariffs on 60 economies after concluding that they failed to impose and effectively enforce prohibitions on imports made with forced labour. Rates vary by economy and product, and USTR says the policy is intended to pressure trading partners to strengthen controls against goods made with forced labour around the world.

The International Labour Organization estimates that 27.6 million people are in forced labour worldwide and that forced labour generates US$236 billion in illegal profits annually. Those figures establish the scale of the problem, but they do not settle the policy debate over tariffs today. USTR argues that weak enforcement creates unfair cost advantages and leaves forced-labour goods in supply chains. Whether country-wide tariffs are sufficiently targeted or the most effective enforcement tool remains a separate question from the severity of the abuse.

What Canada’s $33 Billion Figure Actually Measures

Canada’s C$33 billion figure requires care. Global Affairs Canada says exports of goods and services to markets outside the United States increased by C$33 billion in 2025 compared with 2024. It says goods exports to non-U.S. markets rose by roughly 17 per cent in that period. That is the basis for Sidhu’s claim that Canada is gaining momentum beyond the United States as Ottawa tries to reduce exposure to a single trading partner.

Statistics Canada provides an important distinction. Merchandise exports to non-U.S. destinations rose 17.2 per cent in 2025, but two-way merchandise trade with those countries — exports plus imports — climbed from C$484 billion to C$553 billion, about C$69 billion, or 14.3 per cent. The C$33 billion figure describes growth in non-U.S. exports of goods and services, not the entire increase in two-way non-U.S. trade. Separating those measures prevents the headline number from being interpreted too broadly today.

Diversification Is Real, but U.S. Dependence Remains Deep

Diversification is measurable; the United States remains Canada’s dominant merchandise market. Statistics Canada says the U.S. share of Canadian goods exports fell from 75.9 per cent in 2024 to 71.7 per cent in 2025. The U.S. share of Canadian merchandise imports declined, from 62.3 per cent to 58.8 per cent. Those shifts leave the American market as the destination for more than seven in every ten dollars of Canadian merchandise exports.

The diversification story has limits by sector. Ottawa’s Spring Economic Update said gains came from areas such as gold, aircraft, consumer goods and electronics, while steel, softwood lumber, motor vehicles and parts remained harder to redirect because they are integrated into North American supply chains. The government wants to double goods-and-services exports to non-U.S. markets by 2035. That can expand alternatives, but it cannot replace the geography, infrastructure and supply-chain integration that make U.S. trade so large for Canada.

India Is a Major Test of Canada’s New Trade Push

India is a visible test of Canada’s diversification strategy. Canada and India launched negotiations toward a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in late 2025, and both governments aim to conclude negotiations in 2026. Sidhu told Reuters in September that he was optimistic about reaching an agreement by year-end, with energy, critical minerals and investment among areas under discussion as the countries rebuild commercial ties.

India offers a large market and demand in sectors where Canada is trying to sell more, including energy, agri-food, clean technology and advanced manufacturing. An agreement would still require negotiation over sensitive sectors, tariff schedules and market-access rules rather than an announcement. Sidhu’s Milwaukee schedule matters because he was due to meet Indian Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal on the sidelines. For Canadian exporters, that turns the G20 into a venue where specific market-access negotiations can advance alongside the larger debate over tariffs and global trade rules today.

Europe and ASEAN Offer Additional Routes

Europe and Southeast Asia provide other tracks for Ottawa. Canada and the European Union launched talks on a Digital Trade Agreement in March, building on CETA. They said goods trade has risen more than 75 per cent since CETA’s provisional application began in 2017, while services trade grew 97 per cent. Sidhu was expected to meet European officials in Milwaukee ahead of a Canada-EU summit in Montreal, supporting Canada’s diversification effort.

Canada’s ASEAN strategy has its own timetable. At a September 22 meeting in Manila, ASEAN and Canada aimed to finish talks on an ASEAN-Canada free-trade agreement by the ASEAN Summit in November, with signing planned for 2027. The joint statement said Canada was ASEAN’s 16th-largest trading partner and 10th-largest source of foreign direct investment in 2025. Together, the EU and ASEAN tracks show diversification being pursued through overlapping agreements rather than through a single substitute for U.S. trade today.

The Canada-U.S. Dispute Raises the Stakes

The urgency behind Canada’s outreach stands out against bilateral measures. The United States moved to bar Canadian alcoholic beverages, motorcycles and dairy products from September 29, after Canada applied retaliatory tariffs covering about C$20 billion of U.S. goods. Reuters reported that those measures followed U.S. tariffs of 50 per cent on roughly C$20 billion of Canadian products after negotiations broke down, adding pressure to a strained commercial relationship.

Milwaukee is not a formal restart of bilateral trade talks. The Canadian Press reported that Sidhu was due to speak with Greer, but responsibility for negotiations with Washington rests with Canada-U.S. Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc. That helps explain Canada’s two-track approach: one team manages the U.S. dispute while Sidhu works on alternatives elsewhere. The G20 can create momentum and facilitate side meetings, but Canada’s exposure to the U.S. market means diversification and bilateral stabilization remain parallel tasks rather than interchangeable choices.

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