Former U.S. Ambassador Warns Democrats Cannot Easily Scrap Trump’s Canada Tariffs Despite Election Wins

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Donald Trump’s trade war with Canada has survived a major political setback for his party, and it may survive the Democrats’ sweeping congressional election victory as well.

Following the November 3, 2026, U.S. midterm elections, Democrats are preparing to take control of both chambers of Congress in January 2027, raising hopes that Washington could finally dismantle some of the tariffs affecting Canadian businesses and exporters.

However, former U.S. ambassador to Canada David Cohen is warning that changing Congress does not automatically change American trade policy. Despite Democrats promising to challenge Trump’s tariffs, significant legal and political obstacles remain.

His warning highlights a difficult reality for Ottawa: the path toward tariff relief depends not only on congressional votes but also on presidential authority, negotiations, and the future of the Canada–U.S. trading relationship.

David Cohen Warns Canadians Not to Expect Immediate Tariff Relief

Former U.S. ambassador to Canada David Cohen delivered a cautionary message during a November 15 interview with CBC’s Rosemary Barton. Although Democrats have made reversing Trump’s trade policies a priority, Cohen explained that Congress has limited ability to dismantle tariffs imposed through presidential authority. American lawmakers have delegated significant trade powers to the executive branch over decades, allowing presidents to introduce certain import restrictions without obtaining approval for each measure. That means a change in congressional leadership does not automatically reverse existing policies.

Cohen’s assessment challenges the expectation that the Democratic election victory will quickly restore normal trade between the two countries. He emphasized that reversing Trump’s tariffs would require legislation capable of surviving several congressional obstacles, including the possibility of a presidential veto. For Canadian manufacturers, exporters, and businesses dependent on American customers, the distinction is significant. Political momentum might improve negotiations, but companies must continue operating under existing tariffs until the administration, Congress, or courts produce an actual change.

Democrats Have Won Congress, but Trump Still Controls the White House

The November 3 midterm elections dramatically changed Washington’s political landscape. Democrats secured control of both the House of Representatives and Senate, ending Republican control of Congress and positioning the party to challenge Trump’s economic policies more aggressively. The new congressional majorities will take office on January 3, 2027, giving Democratic lawmakers greater influence over legislative priorities, committee investigations, and government oversight. Trade policy is expected to feature prominently in their early agenda.

However, controlling Congress is fundamentally different from controlling the presidency. Trump remains responsible for directing much of the United States’ trade policy under powers previously delegated by lawmakers. Democrats can introduce tariff-repeal legislation, question administration officials, and investigate the consequences of trade restrictions, but their election victory does not invalidate existing presidential proclamations. This creates an unusual situation for Canada: lawmakers who oppose tariffs will soon control Congress, while the administration responsible for imposing those tariffs retains the authority to negotiate changes. The result could be considerable political pressure without immediate economic relief.

The Senate’s 60-Vote Requirement Creates the First Major Obstacle

One of the biggest challenges facing Democrats is the U.S. Senate’s legislative process. Under Senate rules, most ordinary legislation requires 60 votes to end debate and overcome a filibuster, even though a simple majority is generally sufficient for final passage. During his CBC interview, Cohen pointed out that a Democratic caucus of 56 senators would still be four votes short of that threshold. Securing Republican cooperation would therefore be essential for advancing many proposals to reverse Trump’s trade policies.

Not every tariff-related measure faces identical procedural requirements. Certain resolutions can use special legislative procedures, but those mechanisms do not necessarily apply to newer tariffs imposed under different trade laws. Republican senators might support removing particular duties on Canadian products without agreeing to broader restrictions on presidential authority. That leaves Democrats facing two challenges: building sufficient political support and identifying legislation capable of moving through Congress. Even with control of both chambers, neither objective is guaranteed.

Trump’s Presidential Veto Could Block Democratic Efforts

Even if Democrats successfully pass legislation eliminating certain tariffs, the White House remains a formidable obstacle. Under Article I of the U.S. Constitution, the president can veto legislation approved by Congress. Overriding that veto requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers. With all members voting, that normally means 67 senators and 290 House representatives. Those numbers are substantially higher than the simple majorities Democrats secured in the midterm elections.

This constitutional requirement gives Trump considerable negotiating leverage. His administration has defended tariffs as tools for protecting American industries, responding to foreign trade practices, and encouraging domestic production. Democratic lawmakers argue that many of these measures raise costs for American families and damage relationships with important trading partners. Both positions can generate substantial political pressure, but neither automatically produces a legislative compromise. If Trump rejects a tariff-repeal bill, Democrats would need significant Republican support to defeat his veto. Without that support, legislative opposition could produce high-profile confrontations while leaving the actual tariffs unchanged.

A Nearly Century-Old Trade Law Gives Trump Significant Authority

The legal foundation supporting Trump’s latest tariffs on Canada makes reversing them particularly complicated. In July 2026, the administration invoked Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to introduce additional duties of 50% on certain Canadian products. The measures were connected to American complaints about Canada’s treatment of U.S. commerce involving automobiles, dairy, and alcoholic beverages. After a brief postponement, the new duties took effect on August 22.

Section 338 permits the president to impose tariffs of up to 50% when specified findings of discrimination against American commerce are made. It also authorizes certain import restrictions and allows presidential modifications to existing measures. The administration argues that these powers are necessary to counteract unfair treatment of American exporters. The tariffs do not cover every Canadian product, but the affected trade is substantial: Congressional Research Service analysis places the value of covered imports at approximately US$20 billion using 2025 trade figures. Removing that authority or reversing the duties through Congress requires more than a change in political leadership.

Steel, Aluminum, and Auto Tariffs Present a Separate Battle

Another important complication is that Trump’s tariffs on Canada operate under multiple legal authorities. While Section 338 supports the newer duties affecting selected Canadian products, separate tariffs on industries including steel, aluminum, automobiles, and lumber have been imposed using Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. That law permits trade restrictions based on national-security considerations. Some Canadian products complying with the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, known in Canada as CUSMA, remain exposed to these sector-specific duties.

The distinction means Democrats could successfully challenge one set of tariffs without eliminating restrictions on Canada’s largest manufacturing industries. Changes to Section 338 alone would not automatically remove Section 232 duties. In addition, some Democratic lawmakers support protective tariffs on steel and other industrial products because they believe such policies can safeguard American manufacturing and employment. This creates a political divide between opposing Trump’s broader trade confrontation with Canada and supporting selected measures intended to protect domestic industries. Canadian exporters therefore face several overlapping negotiations rather than one simple decision about restoring free trade.

Congress Has Already Demonstrated Both Opposition and Its Limits

American lawmakers have previously challenged Trump’s tariffs on Canada, providing an important example of congressional opposition without an immediate reversal of trade policy. On February 11, 2026, the House of Representatives approved a resolution opposing tariffs linked to Trump’s February 2025 national emergency declaration. The measure passed by 219 votes to 211, with six Republicans joining nearly all Democratic members. It was an unusually visible bipartisan rejection of an important part of the administration’s trade agenda.

However, the vote did not eliminate the separate tariffs later introduced under Section 338. The February resolution concerned an earlier legal authority, and its narrow margin was nowhere near the two-thirds support necessary to override a presidential veto. The episode demonstrated that lawmakers from both parties could oppose specific Canadian tariffs while also showing how difficult it is to translate congressional disapproval into lasting policy changes. For businesses trying to estimate their future costs, a vote in Washington can be encouraging without changing the duties charged at the border. That distinction remains central to Cohen’s warning.

Democrats Are Preparing Tariff Repeal Plans, but Their Priorities Differ

Democratic leaders have already identified Canadian tariffs as an early priority for the incoming Congress. Senator Ron Wyden, who is expected to lead the Senate Finance Committee, has emphasized restoring congressional authority over trade. Other proposals go further. In September, Senators Kirsten Gillibrand and Peter Welch introduced the BAD DEAL Act, which would eliminate tariffs imposed under Section 338 and provide refunds to affected importers. Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer has also introduced legislation targeting multiple presidential tariff authorities. These efforts demonstrate that opposition extends beyond election promises.

However, agreement on Canadian tariffs does not necessarily translate into agreement on broader protectionist policies. Some Democrats support tariffs on steel, aluminum, and Chinese products because they view them as safeguards for American manufacturing. Meanwhile, research from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York published in October estimated that a 10% increase in average tariffs would raise consumer-goods prices approximately 2.6% after one year. Democrats must therefore balance affordability concerns with competing industrial and employment priorities, making a complete tariff rollback considerably more difficult.

Legal Challenges Could Change the Tariff Fight Without Congressional Approval

Congress is not the only institution capable of challenging Trump’s tariffs. On October 20, 2026, American food importer Gellert Global Group filed a lawsuit in the U.S. Court of International Trade disputing the administration’s use of Section 338. The company argues that the tariffs exceed the authority provided by the statute and seeks relief for affected importers. The case highlights how American companies can also suffer from restrictions imposed on Canadian products. One of Gellert’s suppliers purchases milk from New York dairy farmers, processes it into cheese in Canada, and ships the finished product back to American customers.

The courts have already influenced American tariff policy. In February 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act did not authorize the president to impose tariffs, prompting the administration to rely on other statutory powers. However, the challenge involving Section 338 remains unresolved. A court victory could change the legal basis for particular tariffs, but litigation takes time and can involve appeals. Businesses consequently face uncertainty from both Washington’s political negotiations and ongoing legal proceedings.

Canada’s Auto Industry Remains One of the Biggest Concerns

Canada’s automotive industry is particularly vulnerable to prolonged trade uncertainty because manufacturing operations are deeply integrated across the border. Congressional Research Service data indicate that approximately 90% of Canadian automotive goods exports went to the United States in 2025. Canada also received roughly 38% of American automotive exports that year. This interconnected relationship means tariffs can affect manufacturers, parts suppliers, logistics companies, and workers on both sides of the border.

Prime Minister Mark Carney has repeatedly emphasized that Canada cannot accept a trade agreement that undermines the viability of its automotive industry. Cohen acknowledged this challenge but suggested that a workable deal might not require every tariff to disappear. Speaking hypothetically, he described how lower tariff rates combined with broad exemptions based on North American content and integrated supply chains could protect Canadian vehicle production. He stressed that he was not participating in negotiations. The distinction matters because Ottawa could potentially secure meaningful industrial protection through carefully designed exemptions, even if some headline tariffs remain in place.

CUSMA Remains in Force, but Its Future Is Far From Settled

The dispute has also complicated the future of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, which has governed much of North American trade since 2020. During the agreement’s scheduled joint review on July 1, 2026, Washington declined to extend CUSMA in its existing form. However, that decision did not immediately terminate the agreement. It remains in force, with further reviews expected as the three countries attempt to resolve outstanding disagreements. Without an extension or another agreed solution, the agreement currently faces a 2036 expiry date.

This distinction is important for Canadian exporters. Many products continue to qualify for preferential treatment under CUSMA’s rules of origin, but compliance does not guarantee immunity from every American tariff. Certain Section 338 measures and sector-specific Section 232 duties operate separately from ordinary preferential trading rules. The economic stakes are enormous. Statistics Canada reports that the United States received 71.7% of Canada’s merchandise exports in 2025, down from 75.9% in 2024. Even with diversification underway, Canada remains heavily exposed to decisions made in Washington.

Carney Faces a Difficult Choice as Canada Tries to Rebuild Trade Relations

For Ottawa, the immediate challenge is deciding whether to negotiate a partial reduction in tariffs or wait for a potentially stronger political opening in Washington. On November 14, Carney said he had held substantial discussions with Trump and senior administration officials before travelling to Asia. Although he reported progress toward a possible bilateral agreement, he emphasized that no deal had been reached. Canada has continued negotiating directly with the administration while welcoming Democratic efforts to challenge American tariffs through Congress.

Cohen believes rebuilding the broader relationship will require more than changes to tariff schedules. During his November 15 interview, he argued that Washington must demonstrate humility, acknowledge the damage caused to the relationship, and rebuild Canadian trust through meaningful policy changes. He has also suggested that reducing Canada’s dependence on the American market could ultimately benefit both countries. Ottawa is already pursuing additional trade agreements, including negotiations with Southeast Asian countries and the Philippines. The Democratic victory may create opportunities for Canada, but Cohen’s warning makes the central reality clear: lasting tariff relief and a healthier trading relationship will require more than election results alone.

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