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A new U.S. sanctions law has handed President Donald Trump a powerful tariff tool just months after the Supreme Court restricted his ability to use emergency economic powers for sweeping import taxes. Signed on September 18, 2026, the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act allows tariffs of up to 100% on goods from countries that meet specific criteria involving purchases of Russian oil or natural gas or the facilitation of sanctions evasion.
Canada is not identified as a tariff target under those provisions. That distinction matters as Canadian businesses continue navigating an already complicated trade relationship with the United States. However, the law does mention Canada elsewhere as part of the international coalition enforcing a price cap on Russian oil. The result is a measure that does not presently point at Canada but still substantially expands Washington’s trade-policy arsenal.
The New Law Gives Trump Explicit Tariff Authority
Trump Gets New Power to Levy Tariffs Up to 100% — Canada Is Not Named in the New Law
- The New Law Gives Trump Explicit Tariff Authority
- The 100% Tariff Does Not Automatically Apply to Every Russian Trading Partner
- Canada Is Not an Obvious Candidate Under the Russian-Oil Test
- Canada Is Actually Mentioned Elsewhere in the Law
- Congress Has Given Trump Something the Supreme Court Said He Previously Lacked
- Why Canadian Exporters Will Still Watch the Law Closely
- The First Major Decisions Should Come Quickly
President Trump signed H.R. 5334 into law on September 18 after it cleared the Senate and House with substantial bipartisan support. The measure is formally called the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 and is primarily designed to increase economic pressure on Russia over its war against Ukraine. Its provisions stretch beyond ordinary financial sanctions, targeting Russian banks, energy interests, government-linked entities and vessels used to move Russian commodities while avoiding restrictions.
The trade provisions are especially significant because Congress has now directly authorized the president to impose substantial duties under circumstances spelled out in legislation. Section 112 permits duties of as much as 500% on goods imported directly from Russia. Section 113 creates a separate mechanism aimed at countries buying Russian energy or facilitating sanctions evasion. For those countries, the president is directed to raise U.S. import duties to a rate of up to 100%. The distinction is important: the widely discussed 100% ceiling applies to qualifying third countries, while goods originating in Russia itself face a potentially much higher statutory ceiling.
The 100% Tariff Does Not Automatically Apply to Every Russian Trading Partner
The statute places limits on which countries can fall under its new tariff mechanism. One category covers countries that knowingly make new purchases of Russian-origin crude oil or natural gas beginning 30 days after enactment and that were among the five largest importers of those products during the preceding 12-month period. Another category covers countries ranked among the five biggest facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion.
That means the law is not a blanket authorization to place a 100% tariff on any country simply because it conducts some business with Russia. The statute specifically says the tariff authority cannot be used against countries outside the categories defined in Section 113. The rate is also not automatically fixed at 100%. The legislation establishes a ceiling and gives the U.S. government room to set or subsequently adjust the rate between greater than zero and 100%, depending in part on whether a targeted country increases or reduces its Russian energy purchases. Before duties are imposed, Washington must also provide congressional committees with a written rationale and methodology.
Canada Is Not an Obvious Candidate Under the Russian-Oil Test
Canada’s energy relationship with Russia is very different from that of countries that became major buyers of discounted Russian crude after the invasion of Ukraine. Ottawa announced a prohibition on Russian crude oil imports in 2022, and the federal government has repeatedly stated that Canada had already stopped importing Russian crude before that prohibition took effect. The Department of Finance confirmed in 2025 that the direct import ban remained in force.
Canada also has its own substantial domestic petroleum industry and is a net exporter of crude. Canada still imports crude oil for refineries in parts of the country, but Canada Energy Regulator data show that the majority of those imports come from the United States rather than Russia. Canada imported about 506,000 barrels per day of crude in 2025, down roughly 2% from the previous year. Those circumstances make Canada fundamentally different from economies that depend heavily on Russian energy supplies. Nothing in the statute nevertheless creates a named, permanent exemption for Canada; eligibility is determined by the law’s energy-import and sanctions-evasion criteria rather than by alliance status.
Canada Is Actually Mentioned Elsewhere in the Law
There is an important technical detail behind the Canadian angle. It would be inaccurate to say Canada never appears in the legislation. Canada is explicitly named in a section dealing with Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, where the statute identifies the international Price Cap Coalition. That list includes Canada alongside Australia, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
That reference places Canada on the enforcement side of the Russian-oil restrictions rather than among the countries targeted for buying Russian energy. Canada joined its G7 partners and Australia in implementing the oil-price-cap system in 2022, which was designed to keep Russian oil moving through global markets while limiting the revenue Moscow could earn from it. Ottawa has continued tightening those measures. In 2026, Canada added hundreds of vessels associated with Russia’s shadow fleet to its sanctions regime and lowered its price cap on Russian crude. For that reason, the more precise description is that Canada is not named as a tariff target—not that Canada is absent from the law.
Congress Has Given Trump Something the Supreme Court Said He Previously Lacked
The timing of the legislation makes the tariff language particularly significant. On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act did not itself authorize the president to impose the sweeping tariffs Trump had attempted to use under that statute. The majority emphasized the importance of clear congressional authorization when a president claims extraordinary tariff power, reinforcing Congress’s central constitutional role over duties and taxes.
The new Russia legislation changes that legal landscape for this specific category of tariffs. Instead of relying on a broad emergency statute that never expressly mentioned tariff authority, the administration can now point to legislation in which Congress directly instructs the president to impose duties and establishes numerical limits, eligibility criteria and reporting procedures. That does not make every future application immune from legal challenges; disputes could still arise over whether a country actually satisfies the statutory test or whether the government followed required procedures. But the fundamental authorization question is materially different from the one the Supreme Court confronted earlier this year.
Why Canadian Exporters Will Still Watch the Law Closely
Avoiding the Russian-energy criteria does not make developments in U.S. tariff law irrelevant to Canada. Canada remains extraordinarily dependent on access to the American market. Statistics Canada reported that 71.7% of Canadian merchandise exports went to the United States in 2025, even after that share dropped from 75.9% in 2024 amid growing trade tensions. Billions of dollars in automobiles, energy products, metals, machinery, agricultural goods and other products cross the border every month.
The new law also makes clear that duties imposed under its Russia provisions can be added to other applicable U.S. tariffs, fees or trade remedies. In practice, that means companies must distinguish between several separate American tariff authorities rather than treating “the tariff” as one policy. A Canadian product could be affected by sector-specific measures or another trade statute even if Canada never qualifies for this particular Russia-related tariff. For businesses planning investments or signing long-term supply agreements, the broader concern is therefore not an imminent 100% Russia-related duty on Canada, but the expanding number of statutory tools Washington can use to alter the cost of cross-border commerce.
The First Major Decisions Should Come Quickly
The legislation establishes a relatively fast timetable. Within 30 days of enactment, the administration is supposed to identify qualifying countries and impose the duties required by Section 113. Before doing so, the president or U.S. Trade Representative must provide the appropriate congressional committees with a written justification explaining the tariff rate and the methodology used to determine that the country qualifies. The government must then reassess the major importers of Russian crude and natural gas every 180 days.
Trump also retains considerable flexibility once those determinations are made. The president can issue waivers when he certifies to Congress that doing so is in the U.S. national interest, while tariff rates can be adjusted as targeted countries change their purchasing behaviour. The broader Russia sanctions division is scheduled to terminate five years after enactment unless Congress changes the law. For Canada, the immediate question is less whether a 100% tariff suddenly appears at the border and more whether future U.S. interpretations of Russian energy trade, sanctions evasion and presidential tariff authority alter the country’s already uncertain commercial relationship with its largest trading partner.
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