CBSA Alleges Former Iranian Official Living in Toronto Was ‘Critical’ to Regime Revenue Used for Terror Funding

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A newly disclosed Canadian border-enforcement report is putting a sharper focus on how Ottawa assesses former Iranian officials who have settled in Canada. The Canada Border Services Agency alleges that Abbas Omidi, a former senior official in Iran’s mining bureaucracy who now lives in Toronto, held a position that was “critical” to generating government revenue that ultimately helped sustain Iran’s military and support for terrorist organizations. Omidi disputes the characterization of his government role, describing himself during immigration proceedings as a technical official rather than an influential regime decision-maker. The distinction matters. The CBSA is seeking his removal under Canadian immigration law, but the allegations contained in its report are not the same as a final tribunal finding, and the Immigration and Refugee Board remains the body responsible for deciding whether the government has proved its case.

The CBSA Says Omidi’s Work Went Beyond an Ordinary Government Job

The central allegation comes from a 2024 CBSA report that was among hundreds of pages of evidence submitted in Omidi’s immigration case and later released in redacted form by the Immigration and Refugee Board. According to the report, Omidi’s position in Iran’s Ministry of Industry, Mines and Trade gave him influence over an economically important sector that produced revenue for the Iranian state. The agency alleges that his work therefore contributed materially to the government’s ability to finance the military, weapons programs and organizations Canada and its allies consider terrorist groups. The CBSA went further than simply describing him as a senior bureaucrat, arguing that Omidi’s specialized position made him important to the continued generation of mining revenue.

That wording is significant because Ottawa’s immigration case against Omidi ultimately turns on his standing within the Iranian government, not on an allegation that he personally transferred money to a terrorist organization. The CBSA report links his government responsibilities to a wider financial system in which revenues generated by strategic industries benefit institutions such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Global News, which obtained and reported on the documents, said the terrorism-financing allegations contained in the report were not argued in detail during the public portions of Omidi’s admissibility hearing. No public decision establishing that Omidi personally financed terrorism had been identified when the documents were reported on August 26. That distinction is essential when describing the case fairly.

A 27-Year Government Career Is at the Centre of the Dispute

Omidi’s employment history is one of the strongest points of disagreement between the two sides. Evidence presented at his hearing indicated that he worked in Iran’s public service for nearly 27 years, beginning in the mid-1990s and eventually reaching the level of deputy director general in the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Trade. Reporting on the proceedings said the CBSA identified him more specifically as a senior figure involved in mineral exploration. The agency contends that such a position carried meaningful influence inside a ministry overseeing one of Iran’s major resource industries. In its report, the CBSA also said Omidi earned roughly four times Iran’s national average salary, which it presented as another indicator of the seniority and importance of his position.

Omidi has offered a very different picture. During his hearing, he acknowledged holding the deputy-director-general title but portrayed the work as predominantly technical, arguing that he was several levels below the minister and did not possess high-level political authority. The CBSA countered with statements it said Omidi had previously made during an interview in which he characterized his expertise as unusually difficult to replace. After arriving in Canada in March 2022, Omidi testified that he worked as an Uber driver and continued providing some unpaid consulting assistance related to Iran’s mining sector. Those everyday details make the legal disagreement unusually concrete: the tribunal must look past job titles and determine how much government power Omidi actually exercised.

Why Iran’s Mining and Metals Industries Matter to the Case

The CBSA’s argument gains broader context from the way Iran’s major industrial sectors intersect with state and military institutions. For years, Western governments have targeted Iranian mining and metals businesses through sanctions on the grounds that revenue generated by those industries can strengthen the state and organizations tied to the IRGC. In 2020, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned 17 Iranian metals producers and mining companies and said major steel and iron manufacturers were generating billions of dollars in annual sales. It also noted that Mobarakeh Steel Company, Iran’s largest steel producer, had previously been sanctioned under U.S. counterterrorism authorities for providing material support to an IRGC-affiliated investment company.

The economic overlap extends beyond one company. U.S. Treasury assessments have described the IRGC and its major business holdings as having substantial interests in construction, oil, banking, metals, automobiles and mining. A 2019 Treasury action against Iran’s largest petrochemical holding company similarly described the IRGC as deeply embedded in major areas of the Iranian economy. None of those sanctions findings prove Omidi’s personal involvement in IRGC financing. They do, however, explain why the CBSA regards a senior position inside the ministry responsible for mining and industrial development as potentially more consequential than a conventional civil-service post. The government’s case rests on that connection between bureaucratic authority, industrial revenue and the financial capacity of Iran’s state institutions.

The Terror-Funding Figures Come From a Wider Record on Iran’s Proxy Support

The CBSA report also describes a longstanding system of Iranian support for armed groups across the Middle East. Canadian government briefing material says the IRGC-Qods Force provides funding, weapons and training to groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Iraqi Shia militias and Yemen’s Houthis. Canada lists the IRGC itself, Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad as terrorist entities. When Ottawa added the entire IRGC to the Criminal Code terrorist list in June 2024, Public Safety Canada said there were reasonable grounds to believe the organization had carried out, participated in or facilitated terrorist activity and had acted in association with other listed organizations.

Some of the dollar amounts cited in the CBSA documents reflect older U.S. government estimates rather than a precise accounting of present-day funding. U.S. State Department reporting has estimated Iranian support for Palestinian organizations including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad at up to US$100 million annually. Earlier U.S. assessments put Iran’s annual backing of Hezbollah at approximately US$700 million. Those figures should therefore be understood as historical government estimates illustrating the scale of Iran’s external financing networks, not as verified 2026 expenditure totals. More recent U.S. Treasury enforcement has continued to target Iranian revenue and financial networks on the grounds that money flowing through them supports weapons programs and armed proxies.

Canada Does Not Need to Prove Personal Terror Financing to Pursue Removal

Omidi’s case is also important because Canadian immigration law creates a separate route for excluding senior officials of designated governments. Section 35(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act makes a permanent resident or foreign national inadmissible if that person is a prescribed senior official of a government that the public safety minister considers to have engaged in terrorism, systematic or gross human-rights violations, genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. Canada designated the Iranian government under that provision in November 2022, initially covering senior officials who had served from November 15, 2019 onward.

Ottawa expanded the designation in September 2024 so that it reaches senior Iranian officials who served from June 23, 2003 onward. The government says the category can encompass cabinet members, senior diplomats, judges, senior military and intelligence personnel and senior public servants. This mechanism is legally distinct from Canada’s decision in June 2024 to list the IRGC as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code. In Omidi’s case, the publicly reported CBSA effort focuses on whether his position made him a prescribed senior official of the designated Iranian regime. In other words, a tribunal could find someone inadmissible under the senior-official provision without first concluding that the individual personally committed or financed a terrorist offence.

Omidi’s Defence Highlights Why the IRB Hearing Matters

The process gives Omidi an opportunity to challenge the government’s interpretation of his career and responsibilities. The Immigration and Refugee Board’s Immigration Division is independent of the CBSA. At an admissibility hearing, government counsel presents the reasons an individual should be considered inadmissible, while the person concerned and their lawyer can respond, introduce evidence and dispute the government’s characterization. The tribunal member then decides whether the CBSA has established the allegation. If the member concludes that the person is inadmissible, a removal order can follow; depending on the circumstances, additional avenues of appeal or Federal Court judicial review may remain available.

Omidi has already challenged both the substance and openness of the proceedings. He sought to have his hearing conducted privately, but the IRB rejected that request in March, finding that transparency served an important public interest and that the evidence did not establish a sufficiently serious risk from publicly identifying him. During the merits hearing, Omidi described himself as a technocrat rather than an influential political figure. His lawyer did not respond to Global News requests for comment about the newly released CBSA terror-financing allegations. As of the August 26 report, the IRB had not publicly confirmed to the outlet whether it had issued a final deportation decision in Omidi’s case.

The Case Comes Amid a Much Larger Iranian-Regime Enforcement Effort

Omidi is one case within a growing Canadian enforcement program. CBSA figures current to August 4, 2026 show that the agency had opened 182 investigations into people suspected of being senior officials of the Iranian regime. Ninety-three investigations had been closed because the individual was either no longer in Canada or was determined not to be a senior official, while 52 investigations remained underway. The agency classified 37 people as suspected senior officials at various stages of the process. Of cases already decided by the IRB, four individuals had been found inadmissible as senior regime officials, while seven were found not to meet the threshold.

The numbers also show why identifying a suspected official does not automatically result in removal. Eight suspected senior officials had departed Canada before their admissibility hearings, while two people had been formally removed as of August 4, bringing the documented total no longer in Canada to 10. Separately, following the IRGC’s terrorist listing, the CBSA reported 51 individuals as inadmissible on the basis of alleged IRGC membership, with nine departing before hearings. Each contested case ultimately requires an independent decision. Omidi’s proceeding therefore tests a difficult boundary in Canada’s policy: how to distinguish senior officials who exercised meaningful regime power from technical or lower-level public servants, while ensuring that individuals who genuinely meet the statutory definition cannot use Canada as a safe haven.

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