Canada Awarded More Than $2M in Contracts to Man CSIS Linked to Alleged Iran Missile Work, Records Show

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For years, two branches of the Canadian government appear to have been looking at the same businessman through very different lenses. Public procurement records show federal departments awarded contracts worth more than $2 million to companies controlled by Edmonton businessman Sal Ghafouri, whose legal name is Mohammad Reza Ghafouri Fard. At the same time, Canadian security officials were examining allegations about work he had performed before settling in Canada.

A declassified CSIS security-screening report, disclosed through legal proceedings and reported by Global News, alleged that Ghafouri had previously worked on projects connected to Iran’s military establishment, including missile-defence and electronic-warfare technology. Ghafouri strongly disputes the security allegations. No criminal conviction establishing that he participated in prohibited Iranian military activity has been reported, making the distinction between documented government business and contested intelligence findings essential.

What the Contract Records Actually Show

Federal procurement databases provide the clearest starting point because the numbers can be independently checked. Six contracts listed for Melanite Group have published values totaling roughly $2.14 million. Four additional contracts listed for Radian Group are worth about $271,000. Together, the federal records show approximately $2.41 million in contract values associated with the two companies Ghafouri has operated. The customers were not obscure agencies: they included National Defence, the RCMP, Correctional Service Canada, Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada.

The individual awards ranged dramatically in size. A December 2021 National Defence contract listed for Melanite Group was valued at more than $1.42 million, while a 2024 National Defence road-vehicle contract carried a value of roughly $50,000. Other records include a roughly $380,000 ISED contract and contracts worth more than $100,000 apiece with Correctional Service Canada and National Defence. There is an important accounting caveat: federal contract disclosures can represent the maximum potential value of an agreement, including options or amendments, rather than money ultimately spent. The records therefore establish the value of contracts awarded, not necessarily the exact amount paid out.

The Businessman Behind the Companies

The businessman identified publicly as Sal Ghafouri is Mohammad Reza Ghafouri Fard, according to the security-screening material and court-related reporting. Global News reported that “Sal” was the name he commonly used in business while Salman appeared as a nickname in immigration documentation. After returning to Canada as a permanent resident in 2013, he worked as a research assistant at the University of Alberta before establishing Melanite Group. He later founded Radian Group in 2018 and was reported as the sole director of both companies.

His family background added another layer of sensitivity to the security investigation. His father, Hassan Ghafouri Fard, was a prominent figure in Iranian political life who served in senior government posts, including as a vice-president of Iran, as well as serving in parliament and previously holding the energy portfolio. That family connection is noteworthy but is not evidence that the younger Ghafouri engaged in wrongdoing. In Canada, his public-facing profile was that of a technology entrepreneur and government supplier. Business and innovation-network material has described him as Melanite’s founder and president, illustrating how conventional his commercial activities could appear outside the classified national-security process.

What CSIS Alleged About His Earlier Work in Iran

The most serious claims arise from a CSIS security-screening report dated January 13, 2023. According to reporting based on the declassified document, CSIS assessed that Ghafouri had worked in Iran for an engineering company called Rabi Kosar after leaving a graduate program at Dalhousie University. The intelligence service alleged that the company participated in research and development benefiting Iran’s military establishment and that Ghafouri’s work included projects related to air defence, electronic warfare and military communications.

Among the projects described by CSIS was work associated with the Shahin, an Iranian air-defence missile connected to the Mersad system. The report also referenced a project called RAAD involving electronic warfare and jamming, and SINA, described as a direction-finding system. These are intelligence-service allegations rather than findings from a criminal trial. That distinction matters because security screening operates under different evidentiary rules than criminal prosecution. Ghafouri, through his lawyer, has strongly rejected the characterization that he was involved in prohibited military activity and has argued that his history of government contracting and other Canadian activities is inconsistent with claims that he poses a national-security threat.

The Alleged Procurement Network Behind the Security Concerns

CSIS also alleged that Ghafouri became involved in acquiring components from abroad while employed in Iran. According to the declassified assessment described by Global News, he eventually managed procurement of components using a contact in Malaysia who could source goods from third countries, including the United States. CSIS characterized the arrangement as part of a “covert procurement structure” that it believed helped Iranian military programs obtain foreign technology while navigating international restrictions.

The report also described links between Rabi Kosar and organizations associated with Iran’s defence establishment, including an entity referred to as SA Iran and Iran’s Ministry of Defence. The broader sanctions context is well documented. The U.S. Treasury has designated Iran Electronics Industries, also identified by Treasury as SAIRAN, because of its relationship with Iran’s Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics. Treasury has described the company as producing military electronics, including electronic-warfare, radar and related systems. That sanctions history helps explain why intelligence agencies scrutinize procurement chains for seemingly ordinary electronic components: commercially available parts can have military applications. It does not, by itself, prove that every person who worked with an Iranian engineering supplier knowingly participated in sanctions evasion.

The Meetings With Iranian Intelligence Described by CSIS

CSIS’s concerns were not limited to Ghafouri’s employment history. The security report alleged that after he had obtained Canadian permanent residency, he travelled to Iran and attended two meetings in 2015 with representatives of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, commonly known as MOIS. According to the reported account, the officials questioned him about whether American or Canadian intelligence agencies had approached him and discussed his travel and activities in North America.

CSIS further alleged that Iranian officials warned him about possible approaches from police or intelligence services and advised caution when travelling to the United States. The intelligence service noted in its assessment that MOIS has played a role in acquiring technology of interest to Iran’s military-industrial sector. Again, the existence and significance of these meetings are presented as CSIS’s assessment, not as criminally proven conduct. For an immigrant building a business and a life in Canada, that distinction carries enormous consequences: information viewed as suspicious during national-security screening can affect immigration and citizenship decisions even when it never produces criminal charges. Ghafouri’s legal position is that he has been truthful with Canadian authorities and does not present a security threat.

Government Business Continued While the Security File Developed

The chronology is what makes the case particularly striking. Global News reported that Ghafouri applied for Canadian citizenship roughly four years after becoming a permanent resident, and that his application became subject to security concerns in 2017. Yet companies he controlled subsequently continued obtaining federal contracts. Radian Group records show National Defence contracts in 2018 and 2019, while Melanite received awards from the RCMP, Correctional Service Canada, ISED and National Defence over the years that followed.

The overlap continued even after the January 2023 CSIS assessment. According to Global News, the federal government provided Melanite with a $15,000 grant in 2024 to help adopt new technology. Federal procurement records also show a National Defence contract awarded to Melanite in June 2024, valued at $50,285, for road motor vehicles in Borden, Ontario. The apparent contradiction does not necessarily mean contracting officials ignored a CSIS warning. Different government programs apply different eligibility, integrity and security requirements, and sensitive intelligence is not automatically distributed across every procurement office. The sequence does, however, raise an obvious policy question about whether information relevant to government risk decisions was reaching the departments that needed it.

How the Companies Became Regular Government Suppliers

The contracts themselves covered an unusually broad collection of goods rather than sensitive intelligence services. Reporting and federal records describe purchases ranging from equipment and vehicle-related goods to laboratory or measuring equipment. One RCMP transaction involved specialized equipment, while National Defence contracts included vehicle-related purchases and equipment for military locations. Radian’s records include agricultural-department contracts and Defence purchases. Several publicly available procurement entries state that the awards resulted from competitive processes, with some identifying lowest price as the selection method.

The companies also participated actively in the federal procurement system when they believed competitions had been mishandled. Canada Gazette notices show that Melanite filed complaints with the Canadian International Trade Tribunal in 2019 and again in 2021. One involved a Defence procurement for broadband antennas; another concerned a Shared Services Canada procurement associated with laptop docking stations. The tribunal’s decisions to investigate complaints should not be read as findings that misconduct occurred. Rather, they show Melanite functioning like many established federal suppliers: bidding, challenging procurement decisions and building relationships with public-sector customers. Melanite also stated in 2022 that it joined a Canadian energy trade mission to Colombia, further illustrating its conventional outward-facing business profile.

Citizenship, Removal Proceedings and the Legal Battle

The national-security dispute eventually moved from intelligence assessment into immigration proceedings. Global News reported that Ghafouri’s citizenship application had remained stalled while security verification continued. At one stage, the Canada Border Services Agency investigated whether his earlier employment in Iran could provide grounds for removal. That proceeding was ultimately withdrawn in November 2025, reportedly because the government could not use evidence required to advance the case. The public record does not establish precisely which intelligence evidence created that problem.

The matter did not end there. In May 2026, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada began proceedings that could deny Ghafouri citizenship on grounds that he represented a threat to the security of Canada, according to the reporting. Ghafouri has challenged the government’s handling of his case and sought financial damages, arguing that the prolonged process has caused hardship and prejudice. His lawyer, Bjorna Shkurti, has said the client strongly disputes CSIS’s allegations and intends to pursue available legal remedies. Those ongoing proceedings are important because they mean the core national-security allegations remain contested. Government intelligence assessments deserve scrutiny, but they should not be rewritten as convictions before the legal process reaches its conclusions.

Why Procurement Screening May Not Equal Security Screening

The episode highlights a structural feature of federal procurement that is easy to overlook. Canada has integrity rules designed to determine whether suppliers are eligible to receive federal contracts, while a separate Contract Security Program screens organizations and personnel when a procurement involves classified or otherwise protected information, assets or sensitive worksites. A supplier selling ordinary commercial goods does not automatically undergo the same national-security process required for a contractor accessing protected government information.

That separation can be rational: subjecting every small business selling equipment to government to full intelligence screening would create an enormous administrative burden. But it can also produce silos. University of Ottawa national-security specialist Thomas Juneau told Global News that some separation between agencies is necessary, while describing the apparent fragmentation raised by this case as extreme. Government procurement rules also allow suppliers to remain eligible unless they meet defined grounds for suspension or ineligibility. The unanswered question is therefore less about whether one purchasing officer missed a warning and more about whether Canada has an effective mechanism for deciding when serious intelligence concerns should influence ordinary procurement, grants or government-sponsored trade activities.

What Is Established — and What Remains Alleged

Several parts of the story can be established through public records. Companies controlled by Ghafouri received federal contracts whose disclosed values exceed $2 million. His businesses dealt with departments that included National Defence, the RCMP, Correctional Service Canada, ISED and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. CSIS produced a security-screening assessment about his history, his citizenship process encountered security concerns, and immigration authorities later initiated proceedings relying on national-security grounds. Those points are distinct from proving the intelligence allegations themselves.

The claims about military missile work, covert procurement and contacts with Iranian intelligence remain allegations attributed to CSIS and are strongly disputed by Ghafouri. That distinction has become even more significant as Canada has tightened its posture toward Tehran. Ottawa formally listed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist entity in June 2024 and has imposed sanctions on hundreds of Iranian individuals and entities. None of those broader actions establish Ghafouri’s personal culpability. What the case does reveal is an unusually stark collision between two government systems: one treated his companies as eligible suppliers worth millions of dollars in public contracts, while another developed an intelligence assessment serious enough to place his path to citizenship in jeopardy.

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