Anand Says Canada’s ‘Middle Power’ Strategy Is Gaining Ground as Ottawa Builds Alliances Beyond U.S. Dependence

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Canada’s effort to build a wider network of international partners is moving from speeches into diplomacy, trade negotiations and security agreements. Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand said at the United Nations on September 22 that Ottawa believes its “middle power strategy” is beginning to bear fruit, nine months after Prime Minister Mark Carney argued that countries outside the world’s largest powers needed to work together more deliberately. The shift does not mean Canada is severing its relationship with the United States. Geography, trade and continental defence make that unrealistic. Instead, Ottawa is trying to reduce the risks that come with depending too heavily on any single partner while strengthening relationships across Europe, Asia, Africa and other regions. The test now is whether a growing collection of diplomatic agreements can produce lasting economic and strategic leverage.

Anand Says the Strategy Is Moving From Theory to Practice

The immediate evidence Anand pointed to was visible around the United Nations General Assembly itself. In an Associated Press interview, the foreign minister said Canada sees its middle-power strategy “bearing fruit” and described the UN gathering as an opportunity to deepen that network. A day earlier, Canada had helped launch Partners for Multilateralism, or P4M, alongside Australia, Barbados, Brazil, India, Kenya and the European Union. The initiative is designed as a flexible forum for countries seeking cooperation on international law, economic resilience, artificial intelligence, climate issues and reform of multilateral institutions. Anand described Canada’s broader foreign-policy approach as “principled pragmatism.”

That matters because Ottawa is trying to turn a broad concept into smaller, issue-specific coalitions. Global Affairs Canada has described this approach as working through flexible partnerships where countries share particular interests, rather than expecting every ally to agree on every issue. Canada has simultaneously convened or participated in groupings involving Nordic and Baltic states, ASEAN governments, Caribbean countries and European partners. Those meetings alone do not prove that Canada has acquired greater global influence, but they provide concrete evidence that the government is building the diplomatic network envisioned in Carney’s January 2026 call for greater middle-power cooperation.

Trade Dependence on the United States Remains the Central Economic Problem

Canada’s diversification effort starts with an unusually concentrated trade relationship. Statistics Canada reported that 71.7% of Canadian merchandise exports went to the United States in 2025. That was down noticeably from 75.9% in 2024, while the U.S. share of Canadian merchandise imports declined from 62.3% to 58.8%. At the same time, Canadian exports to countries other than the United States increased 17.2% during 2025. Total merchandise trade with non-U.S. countries reached approximately $553 billion, up 14.3% from the previous year. Those numbers provide some measurable support for the claim that diversification is already occurring, though the American market remains dominant.

Ottawa has consequently adopted a goal of doubling non-U.S. exports over the coming decade, which the government estimates would produce roughly $300 billion in additional international orders for Canadian goods, resources and expertise. The strategy extends beyond signing trade agreements. Federal plans include trade infrastructure, investment attraction, new commercial partnerships and negotiations involving ASEAN, India, the Philippines, Thailand and other markets. The scale of the task remains substantial. Even rapid growth elsewhere must start from a much smaller base than Canada’s enormous cross-border commercial relationship with the United States. Diversification therefore represents a long-term effort to reduce concentration rather than a short-term replacement for American trade.

Europe Has Become One of Ottawa’s Most Important Diversification Anchors

Europe provides perhaps the clearest example of Canada trying to convert middle-power diplomacy into economic and security infrastructure. During a September visit to Strasbourg, Carney proposed a significantly more integrated Canada-European Union relationship covering critical minerals, defence manufacturing, energy, artificial intelligence, computing, space and financial services. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Carney discussed moving beyond the existing Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement toward a broader strategic arrangement. Ottawa has presented Europe as a partner whose manufacturing, research and market scale could complement Canada’s resources and technological capabilities.

Security cooperation has also advanced beyond diplomatic statements. Canada and the EU signed a Security and Defence Partnership in June 2025, and Canada formally joined the EU’s Security Action for Europe initiative in February 2026. The Department of National Defence says Canada is the only non-European participant in that program, which opens additional possibilities for Canadian defence companies to participate in European procurement. Meanwhile, Anand has continued discussions with European counterparts on Ukraine, critical minerals, economic security and digital trade. The relationship therefore increasingly covers both commerce and national security — an important distinction because Ottawa’s diversification agenda is not being pursued solely through traditional free-trade policy.

Nordic and Baltic Countries Fit the Middle-Power Model Closely

The Nordic and Baltic region offers another practical example of Ottawa’s preferred approach. On September 22, Anand and Estonia’s foreign minister convened the first ministerial meeting between Canada and the Nordic-Baltic Eight, bringing together Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden. The participants emphasized international law, Ukraine, NATO cooperation and resistance to changing borders by force. The grouping is especially relevant for Canada because many of its members face similar questions involving Arctic security, Russia, energy systems and the need to increase defence capacity without possessing the scale of the world’s largest military powers.

The diplomatic work builds on earlier cooperation. Canada and the Nordic countries discussed closer military procurement and strategic coordination at a March meeting in Oslo, while Canada and several European partners have expanded defence-industrial arrangements separately. These partnerships illustrate Carney’s concept of “variable geometry”: instead of establishing one new alliance intended to address everything, governments form different combinations depending on the problem. Arctic surveillance might involve one collection of countries, defence procurement another and critical-mineral supply chains another. Independent analysts have noted that such flexibility can create options for middle powers, although maintaining numerous overlapping coalitions can also make coordination more difficult.

Southeast Asia Is Becoming a Major Test of the Economic Strategy

Canada’s Indo-Pacific outreach provides one of the clearest places to watch whether diplomatic diversification turns into larger trade flows. ASEAN’s 11 member states were Canada’s fifth-largest merchandise trading partner as a group in 2025, with bilateral merchandise trade totalling $52.4 billion. During Anand’s July visit to Manila, Canada and ASEAN adopted a 2026-to-2030 action plan covering trade, investment, regional security and economic cooperation. Canada’s broader Indo-Pacific Strategy has committed $2.3 billion over its first five years to measures ranging from trade promotion to an increased diplomatic and military presence.

Trade negotiations have subsequently accelerated. International Trade Minister Maninder Sidhu said in September that talks with ASEAN and the Philippines were advancing, while Reuters reported that negotiations were more than 90% complete and that Ottawa hoped to finish them by November. Canada is also developing a strategic partnership with the Philippines involving trade, energy, defence and tourism, while a new economic framework with Singapore covers emerging technologies, resilient supply chains, food security and energy. These relationships give Ottawa access to rapidly growing markets, but signing agreements is only the beginning. Businesses still need transportation capacity, competitive products and sustained investment before diplomatic diversification becomes large-scale economic diversification.

India, Africa and the Caribbean Broaden the Network Further

Ottawa’s strategy is deliberately extending beyond Canada’s traditional European and Pacific partners. Canada and India formally launched negotiations toward a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in late 2025, and the two governments agreed in March 2026 to accelerate the talks with an objective of concluding them this year. The leaders also set a goal of doubling bilateral trade within five years. Cooperation now includes areas such as critical minerals, energy, innovation and agriculture, illustrating Ottawa’s willingness to rebuild relationships where political tensions had previously limited engagement.

Anand has pursued a similar expansion in Africa and the Caribbean. She travelled to Benin and Côte d’Ivoire in August under Canada’s Africa Strategy, which seeks greater economic cooperation, stronger diplomatic engagement and partnerships in security and development. Canadian merchandise trade with African countries was worth $15.1 billion in 2024, nearly 30% higher than five years earlier. Canada has also strengthened the Canada-CARICOM foreign ministers process, explicitly describing coalition-building as increasingly important amid changes in the global order. These relationships remain economically smaller than Canada’s U.S. and European links, but they expand the range of governments Ottawa can work with on trade, development and international institutions.

Security Diversification Does Not Mean Canada Can Leave the U.S. Behind

The most important limitation on any discussion about reducing U.S. dependence is continental defence. Canada and the United States jointly operate NORAD, the binational command responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control and maritime warning across North America. The Canadian government continues to describe the U.S. defence relationship as central to North American security and is spending $38.6 billion over 20 years modernizing its contribution to NORAD. Canadian and American forces also share deeply integrated defence infrastructure, exercises, intelligence and industrial supply chains.

Canada is therefore pursuing additional partnerships alongside — rather than in place of — its geographic connection to the United States. The same government expanding EU defence cooperation has reaffirmed NATO commitments and continued NORAD modernization. This distinction is central to understanding the strategy. Greater cooperation with Europe, Asian democracies or Nordic countries can provide alternative suppliers, investment partners and diplomatic support, but it cannot change the fact that Canada shares the world’s longest international border with the United States and participates in a continental defence system built over generations. The practical objective is greater room for independent action, not complete strategic separation.

The Real Measure Will Be Whether New Relationships Produce Durable Leverage

There are already tangible signs of change: Canada’s non-U.S. trade expanded substantially in 2025, new defence frameworks with Europe have moved into implementation, ASEAN negotiations are approaching their final stages, and new multinational initiatives such as P4M and the Canada-Nordic-Baltic format have been established. Those developments help explain why Anand can argue that the middle-power strategy is gaining traction. They do not, however, establish that Canada has solved the structural vulnerabilities that prompted the strategy in the first place. Most Canadian merchandise exports still go to the United States, and North American security remains institutionally intertwined.

Independent analysts have identified the same tension. CIGI researchers have argued that middle-power coalitions can increase strategic options but warn that loosely connected arrangements may lack the coordination and institutional capacity needed to generate sustained leverage. Academic work on Canada has similarly emphasized the tension between traditional middle-power ambitions and unavoidable geographic dependence on the United States. The coming years will therefore provide a clearer test than the number of meetings or agreements announced in 2026. Success would be reflected in measurable trade diversification, stronger domestic infrastructure, durable defence partnerships and an ability to pursue Canadian priorities without excessive exposure to decisions made elsewhere.

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